April 8th, 2013 Alex Jurshevski
In modern social psychology, cognitive dissonance is the feeling of discomfort when simultaneously holding two or more conflicting cognitions: ideas, beliefs, values or emotional reactions in your mind at the same time. The theory of cognitive dissonance proposes that people have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance by altering existing cognitions, adding new ones to create a consistent belief system, or alternatively by reducing the importance of any one of the dissonant elements.
Source: Wikipedia
Following last week’s announcement by Bank of Japan Governor Kuroda that it will “do anything it can” to get Japanese inflation up to 2%, JPMorgan said in a communication that the Japanese, European and U.S. central banks are now in the same camp when it comes to monetary stimulus. The JPM economist who provided that assessment is undoubtedly well-remunerated, being in the regular habit of taking obscurantist developments and putting them in language that his less erudite bosses find comforting, easy to understand and easy to pass on as Gospel to the bank’s clients and investors.
In fact, based on actual statements made recently by these various central banking institutions, it seems that nothing could be further from the truth.
In January, Bloomberg blared the headline “Bernanke Dissatisfied With Growth Will Press on With QE Paceâ€. The Fed seems to be expecting growth and NOT inflation to be the result of its QE program.
Based in his recent comments ECB Governor Draghi is also focused on pushing a form of QE in the hopes that Euro-Zone Growth can recover to a more stable and higher growth path.
However, in contrast, the BOJ is hoping for inflation, and not growth. The specifics are simply that Governor Kuroda announced plans to double the BOJ’’s monthly bond purchases and achieve 2 per cent annual inflation within the next 2 years. This follows the smaller-sized, though entirely similar, expansionary policy that in the last two years has caused the Yen to fall almost 20 percent against the majors. Only the Venezuelan Bolivar and Malawian Kwacha have fallen by more over the same period.
The reality is that over the last 4 years one of the most enduring fictions promulgated by the authorities and their handmaidens on 19th Street, is that central bank money printing and central government pump priming will act together to generate self sustaining growth in the economies hit by the Global Financial Crisis. This is an elaborate fantasy on which we have commented before.
There is in fact no amount of funny money and deficit finance that can steer things back onto a sustainable path unless the obstacles to growth and recovery are removed. All of the serious economic research and actual economic history that we have reviewed supports this central truth.
And now we have evidence that the world’s central bankers do not even agree on what it is possible to achieve through QE.
Is it inflation or is it growth??
This is like asking you if the objective of your exercise regimen is to gain more muscle or more fat and you actually believe that you can achieve either by following the same plan.
The real reason for the QE being pursued in the various economies of the G7 and the Euro-Zone is that Government finances in certain key countries are hemorrhaging and that this is interfering with the ability of certain Governments  to even keep up the pretence that financing requirements can be funded in the normal course.
As such the latest BOJ announcement is a sign of weakness and cause for concern rather than renewed hope. The markets which rallied on the news have got it wrong.

Source: The Japan Times
Beyond this, there are additional problems and concerns specific to the just announced Japanese policy update. For example
- Financial Policy. THis latest policy wheeze is nothing more than another salvo in an ongoing currency war. Therefore it is only likely that Japan’s trading partners will pressure the Government there to slacken their efforts to weaken the Yen in order to preserve their own growth prospects. This could lead to international tensions over economic policies;
- Monetary Policy Flexibility. The BOJ has been expanding its QE more aggressively than either the the FED and ECB, burdening its balance sheet with riskier assets and making even the possibility of an exit from this policy nothing more than a wistful fancy;
- Investor and Consumer Behavior. The QE policy distorts price signals; obscures the risk and risk/reward properties of investments; penalizes savers at the expense of borrowers (The Government being the biggest with the biggest interest tab. See above.) and encourages mal-investment;
- Starting Point Risk. This policy does not sufficiently take into account the very serious structural problems in the Japanese economy which have hampered growth and resulted in deflation. These include, most importantly the failure to properly remediate weakness in bank balance sheets, the effects of an aging population, including waning tax receipts; and the fact that Japan already has the largest (and effectively unsustainable) debt load on the face of the planet;
- Re-entry Risk. Monetary Policy implementation is a very uncertain process and the transmission mechanisms and relationships are not stable or predictable in even the medium term. There is no plan, no way to reverse what is being proposed, not in Japan, not in Europe and not in the US. If these policies do act on inflation and money demand drops as the policymakers wish, then it may trigger a self reinforcing bout of price  inflation that (a) will be hard to control; (b) will cause a variety of easily anticipated economic problems, and (c) very likely create new unanticipated problems, stresses and conflicts relating to the policies of competitive devaluation that are being pursued.
Of course we are sure that the policy wonks at the BOJ (and the FED and the ECB) are completely aware of the dangers and problems regarding their policies and of which we write. It is just that they cannot muster the intestinal fortitude, leadership and political will to opt for a solution that does not amount to a combination of bargain basement wallpaper, cheap glue and a snappy sales patter.
Therefore, at this juncture it is of only one thing we can be certain: if there is a limit to “safe money printing” (as if this term is not an oxymoron in and of itself), then the current set of central bank incumbents seem dead-set on finding it.
“…nobody is qualified to wield unlimited power.”
Friedrich von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 1960
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June 13th, 2012 Alex Jurshevski
(This title is attributable to Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra – “Don Quixote”)
Recovery Partners was interviewed last Friday and again this past Monday regarding developments in the European debt crisis. Unfortunately these interviews only allow a little time to get some sound bites in and not a whole lot of time for reasoned analysis. Therefore this blog is aimed at adding some needed color and insight to the SUN TV and BNN interviews that underline the seriousness of the situation.
The simple reality is that not much has been done to solve any of Europe’s financial problems since they started over three years ago and, as a consequence, the available runway that European policymakers have left with which to craft workable solutions to the debt mess is getting very short. What is extremely concerning therefore, is that the latest events indicate that the Euro-strategy of incrementalism and trying to stretch out the process before hard decisions have to be made is being pursued by the Eurocrats and politicians there with even more vigor now.
After dithering for years about the rot in the Spanish banking sector and botching the recapitalization of several failed banks a few short weeks ago, the political authorities there finally and reluctantly agreed to accepting aid from the Eurozone this past weekend. In flippant style, Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy triumphantly declared that he had arranged a “handy credit line†and that the crisis was “now over†before jetting off to Poland to see the Spanish footballers tie the Azzurri 1-1 in Gdansk.
When have we heard this type of denial before?
There is in fact much to worry about in the wake of the news regarding the Spanish bank bailout not in the least because there are more questions than answers coming out of this series of announcements
As we mentioned  in the TV interviews, these issues include:
- The fact that the EUR 100 MM amount mentioned, while much larger than the authorities may have admitted they were short in the past, is still likely far below the amounts that are really required. Certain estimates place the size of the hole at around EUR 400 Billion.
- The housing and real estate markets have been artificially propped up in Spain for years. Not only does this mean that it is now almost impossible to understand values without significant due diligence, this strongly suggests that there may be another downleg to the real estate bust there that would see even those lofty bailout requirements climb.
- This “credit line†as Rajoy so euphemistically termed the panic decision involving EUR 100 Billion (or more) piles more debt onto the very large debt load that Spain already has. Spanish central government funding requirements approach EUR 220 Billion for 2012 and almost EUR 170 Billion for 2013. Unfortunately, Spain is all but foreclosed from the traditional bond markets. Where will that funding and the not insubstantial funding for local governments not included in those requirements come from?
- But even before we consider the source of general Government funding requirements it is not even clear where this bank bailout money is going to come from or the specific terms of the deal. This table, drawn from a speech we recently delivered at an RBC Dexia client seminar, shows that for all intents and purposes that the EFSF mechanism is already tapped out. After accounting for dud guarantees and monies already earmarked, there is almost nothing left over. Note that the “Bank Recap” line in the table refers to the EUR 110 Billion that was only a few short months ago estimated by the ECB and IMF that the entire European Banking system needed. Now we find that Spain itself has gobbled up EUR 100 Billion. Also please note that the EFSF/ESM mechanism has been unable to fund itself and has been dowdgraded.
- What will the Greeks, Portuguese and Irish now think about the deals that they agreed to and will they now demand a “look-back†adjustment to the terms of those deals? Almost equally as important: What will now happen to the Italians who have mountains of debt to refinance and a government that, as admitted by Prime Minister Monti last week, is in its death throes and will likely have to call a snap election before its term expires next Spring? Italy is next in line to be punished by the markets and everyone knows it, yet there is no lifeline in place and moreover, none of the myriad zombie problems festering away elsewhere in Europe have been durably fixed.
- Similar to the Greek re-boot, this transaction calls into question the seniority of existing Spanish government debt obligations, potentially subordinating those to the creditor group that will make the “handy credit line†(ie BAILOUT) money available. This action has increased the risk of these obligations and has thus cast significant doubt over the ability of the Spaniards to raise any money at all from domestic and international bond markets.
Boiling all of this down, we come to the conclusion that we are seeing a tragedy play out in Spain that is very similar to the one still underway in Greece: The central Government has been foreclosed from raising money in the open market; there is an accelerating bank run in progress; to cope, Â a hastily conceived bailout patch is applied by the ECB, IMF and EU which results in the very significant probability that Spain will continue to be unable to meet its financing requirements in the normal course. This Financial Frankenstein thus threatens to run smack into the refinancing obligations that loom just ahead.
Given the magnitude of Spain’s funding requirements and the cross border exposures it has to the rest of Europe, this policy is thus far from being a “handy credit line†as described by Prime Minister Rajoy. It rather more completely resembles a financial time bomb with the detonator already having been set in motion.
Nothing in this is therefore any cause for renewed confidence.

We reiterate the point that we have been making for several years now: Nothing has been solved by the various policy patches that have been applied by the Fed and other Central Banks together with the politicians in Europe and North America. Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis all that has been achieved are temporary delays and the imposition of growing and severe constraints on future policy flexibility, while at the same time the risk of unanticipated open-ended outcomes, second order effects and other nasty surprises (Black Swans) has been vastly increased because of the approach followed. There is now a non-trivial risk that this Black Swan phenomenon could overwhelm the ability of existing institutions to successfully and properly cope with the various problems unless decisive action – loss recognition, write-down and remediation – is taken soon.
The experience so far easily proves that anything short of swallowing that bitter pill simply won’t work.
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February 16th, 2012 Alex Jurshevski
Late yesterday the Moody’s Ratings agency announced that it was considering a downgrade of a number of Euro-zone, US and Canadian banks including Canada’s largest and arguably its most venerable banking institution, the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC). Readers might recall that Moody’s stripped the RBC of its Aaa rating in December 2010.
At the time this was not much of a surprise because the bank had been placed on negative credit watch earlier in that year largely due to an announcement by the RBC that it was seeking to generate a larger share of its total bottom line from Capital Markets businesses. The downgrade also occurred despite RBC having emerged from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) relatively unscathed and in much better shape than most of its offshore competitors. Other agencies soon followed suit with their own downgrades for the bank.
The RBC is currently rated AA- by S&P and Aa1 by Moody’s. Fitch, and DBRS the other major agency and Canada’s domestic credit watchdog respectively, both peg the RBC credit quality at AA. Thus while the latest Moody’s announcement will bring their ratings assessment into line with their major competitor, it still remains above the credit assessment given by the two smaller agencies
The recent ratings action again pays reference to that fact that RBC’s announced business plans are running into strong headwinds, not in the least due to the furor over implementation of the Volcker rule, but also because the markets that it is seeking to exploit in the search for revenues are running into difficulties in the form of widening spreads, lower volumes, poor funding conditions and deteriorating investor appetite.
Other Banks under review for possible downgrades include Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley; and Moody’s said it is extending its reviews on whether to lower ratings on Credit Suisse, Macquarie, Nomura, UBS, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland and Societe Generale. Moody’s also extended ongoing reviews for downgrades on 11 companies.
Pointing to regulatory, balance sheet and liquidity the agency said in a statement after markets closed last night: “These difficulties, together with inherent vulnerabilities such as confidence-sensitivity, interconnectedness, and opacity of risk, have diminished the longer term profitability and growth prospects of these firmsâ€.
The Moody’s news came hard on the heels of credit downgrades for a number of Euro-zone countries including Italy, Portugal and Spain because of uncertainty over the weakening profile of economic activity in Europe and a growing credibility gap regarding the advisability of the polices being forced on debtor countries by the EU/ECB/IMF “Troikaâ€.

Do these Announcements now make the World now “Safer†from Financial Calamity?
Nothing could be further from the Truth.
In our opinion here at Recovery Partners, this latest wheeze from the Ratings Agencies is comparable to the fevered activity of Balinese pool boys trying to rearrange deck chairs in the middle of a force-5 Typhoon.
While EU leaders have droned on for the last several years about their intentions of putting a “firewall†around the banks and nations most afflicted by the euro zone debt crisis, nothing of the sort has occurred. In fact, the recent Long Term Refinancing Operation (“LTROâ€) in Europe and ongoing easements in collateral rules make a massive outbreak of contagion more likely rather than less likely because, systemic risk is increasingly becoming a function of the credit quality of the weakest banks, rather than the strongest banks. The ratings agencies’ recent focus on the stronger banks such as the RBC only serve to underscore the point that these announcements are largely a sideshow.
As we know, mark-to-market rules have either been overtly suppressed by regulators in Europe and North America or ignored.
In fact, given the unrelenting stresses in the interbank markets in Europe and elsewhere, we are wondering whether or not we are close to an explicit “event of diktat†similar to what was recently announced by the Chinese authorities. Not widely publicized, a particular example of how bad things are is given by China, the authorities there have recently commanded the banks to roll over maturing loans to local authorities in full knowledge that they are non-performing and cannot be, and will not be, paid back even under the rosiest of scenarios because they are backed by asset positions that are largely worthless and non-income producing. In the wake of the GFC, Chinese Banks lent the equivalent of 25% of Chinese GDP to local authorities. This is not a small problem.
Having the central government tell the Chinese banks to represent (to the regulator controlled by it no less!) Â that the loans are sound will not make them pay off nor reduce the eventual chop that the banks will have to take. This subterfuge only postpones the inevitable day of reckoning and contributes to further uncertainty.
A notch or two on RBC’s rating or on the ratings of similar banks is hardly an issue that anyone should lose sleep over in the current environment. There are much, much bigger demons out there.
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January 31st, 2012 Alex Jurshevski
Financial Repression is being implemented by Monetary and Financial Authorities in many developed economies. The specific measures range from overt manipulation of traded markets, acquisition of toxic assets at off-market prices, an aversion to implementing needed restructuring of bankrupt entities, through to indirect forms of intervention such as we are witness to in Canada. The short term consequences of these types of policies include restraining economic growth, employment and productivity. Longer term consequences include inducing a greater predisposition towards inflationary policies by the monetary authorities, loss of competitiveness, moral hazard, below potential GDP growth and depressed rates of capital formation.
The Canadian Experience
In Canada so far our Central Authorities have refrained from overtly intervening in markets as noted above. That job has been left to the Crown Corporations. The Economic Action Plan announced in 2008 provided the Crowns with additional capital and a mandate to use that capital to support Small and Medium sized businesses in Canada (SMEs). Since then the Crowns have made no secret of their extended mandate.
Thus, one need not look far to find evidence of this “stealth bailout”. In Canada we have seen rapid increases in personal bankruptcies that mirror the weakness in the jobs picture and the cost-cutting efforts of many firms desperate to remain in business. Also, the number of personal bankruptcies has escalated rapidly, consistent with the scale of job losses in the early stages of the GFC. However, on the business side of the coin, the situation in Canada reflects the perverse nature of this stealth bailout. This is the fact that since the onset of the GFC the business bankruptcy statistics are not telling a tale of undue financial stress. In fact, the latest twenty four months of data show that the incidence of corporate failures in Canada has actually gone down! The data show that there were 38% fewer bankruptcies coast-to-coast in the year to October 2011 than 2007 just prior to the GFC.
The “Pig in the Python”

At the same time according to the chart, at the peak in 2010 there waa an almost foufold increase in Gross Impaired Loans (GIL) in Canada. In 2011 the GIL numbers were still almost three times higher than in 2007 and prior to the GFC. Yet, corporate bankruptcies have gone down! Moreover, if you speak to them most insolvency professionals report that business has been at it lowest ebb that they have seen over their entire careers! A number of Canadian restructuring firms have sharply cut back staff, gone out of business or have otherwise greatly curtailed their operations. Per the above-noted chart the chief cause is that the banks are not reprocessing their NPL assets in a manner consistent with past cycles and have instead been exercising extreme forbearance.
The bottom line is the fact that a large volume of restructuring that would have normally been expected to occur on the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008/2009 has simply not occurred.
Quantitative Analysis
The statistical records on corporate failures in Canada that have been maintained by the Superintendant of Bankruptcy extend back almost sixty years. The behavior of this time-series is akin to that of a step function. Historically there has always been a sharp increase in the incidence of corporate failure in the immediate aftermath of an economic slowdown or recession. This relationship has held up through numerous cycles up to, but not including the GFC. And, in looking at past cycles, the increase in the failure rates on a twelve month moving average basis was at times as high as 60% peak to trough.
The past decade has seen three distinct phases of restructuring activity in Canada. Between 2000-2003 in the wake of the Telecoms, Internet and Media bust, Canadian banks resorted to bulk sales to divest themselves of unwanted assets and distressed files. Two of the more motivated banks in this regard were CIBC and the TD. Then, between 2004-2007 the bulk of off-strategy and distressed files were pieced out by way of bilateral loan sales to leveraged loan funds that were relatively credit and price insensitive. Both of these periods saw significant levels of activity where banks were actively repositioning credit risk in their portfolios. Following that and since 2008, and up to the present, there has been very little activity despite a sharp run up in Gross Impaired Loans balances. There has been a corresponding lack of activity in business failures and active restructuring of loan files.
To examine the history further we have used three quantitative approaches to estimate a possible shortfall in the number of business failures that have occurred since the GFC:
The first test we ran tested the null hypothesis that the distribution of failures before the GFC had the same statistical properties as the distribution of failure events following the GFC. The results here show that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the distributions are different. This provides some statistical support for the contention that we are in a different behavioral phase with bankruptcies and corporate restructuring in Canada now relative to what went on before the GFC.
We then used two other methods to drag some more information out of the data set. The objective of both tests was to try and determine if the level of business failures that we have experienced in Canada since the GFC is “unusually low” and is so by how much. In summary this exercise suggests that there is at present a “restructuring deficit” of between some 6,000 and 13,000 businesses that could have been expected to have gone bust in the last three years but did not (This translates into between approximately one-half to one percent of all SME businesses in Canada). Translating those figures into potential monetary exposures Recovery Partners estimates that there are at least $20 to $30 billion of loan-related charge offs and or restructuring candidates that are bottled up on chartered bank balance sheets and elsewhere.
Zombie finance works only once. At the time this strategy was implemented the expectation was that the significant stimulus that was pumped into the economy would have resulted in a fairly rapid pace of recovery. In turn this would have refloated the businesses that were underwater allowing them to return to profitability and pay down their debt. This clearly has not happened. And, it is unlikely that the old zombies will be able to pull off another rescue financing particularly if the economy continues to grind along at a low rate of expansion or if it falters and maybe another downturn works its way into the mix.
A Rising Default Environment
A number of macro-economic factors affecting credit markets worldwide, including in Canada, suggest that all credit markets are entering a rising default rate environment. Both US and Canadian consumers are beginning to exhibit substantial signs of spending fatigue simultaneously with a significant, and accelerating, renewed softening of residential real estate markets in the US — the source of a substantial portion of consumer spending and employment growth in the last decade. Moreover the widening crisis in the Euro zone has already knocked EU growth for a loop as a recession is now expected there. The inevitable contagion will likely lead to confidence problems in North America as well threatening a more protracted slowdown here as well.
Therefore, for the banks, time is running short. Further cracks are appearing in the banking system and the economy and the authorities cannot stop them from spreading. In fact our views on the Stress Tests reflect the opinion that the problems in the banking system are far from having been properly resolved. In the US, in aggregate, banks remain significantly undercapitalized. Moreover, numerous US Banks that have earlier qualified for TARP funds now have more toxic (Level 3) assets on their books than before the financial crisis began. Other areas of concern include credit cards, commercial mortgages, and of course the fact that anecdotal and other evidence continues to reflect an anemic US economy whose consumers are tapped out and who have either fallen into unemployment or under-employment in vast numbers, where a substantial portion of the housing stock is under water, and whose Government is in a deepening fiscal hole.

In Canada, the situation may be even riper for a downturn in the credit cycle, especially in the export sector. The Canadian dollar has appreciated against the US dollar by more than 40% substantially eroding profit margins for Canadian exporters. For many of the banks as well, it is a case of “they do not know what they do not know”. Quite simply this means, that because of the distortions caused by zero interest rates, the lax forbearance practices and easements in lending covenants and loan servicing, many banks cannot today reliably identify all of the zombies and at-risk obligors in their portfolios. There is thus a substantial recognition lag built into the required solution to this problem.
Should the economy slow from here or enter a recession, institutions that hold large quantities of bad or deteriorating credits that have hitherto been slow in dealing with these exposures will find themselves competing against each other to unload or otherwise cope with these problems. Moreover, to existing exposures we have to add the new zombies that will have gone to ground because of continued weakness in overall activity.
This article is an abridgment of a longer research piece written by Alex Jurshevski, Managing Partner of Recovery Partners with research assistance from David R Fine, Director Credit Asset Management at Recovery Partners and appears in the January 2012 edition of Canadian Hedgewatch
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September 13th, 2011 Alex Jurshevski
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Who guards the guardians?)
Juvenal
It all seems to be coming down to the wire: Slowdwn in the US and Europe, downgrade of economic propects in Canada; Greece on the brink of default and financial contagion feared as a consequence. Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) the markets have repeatedly received asurances from the authorities that the situation was containable and under control and that the policy path set by them was appropriate. Now it seems that these assurances were misplaced. Where did it all go so horribly wrong?
The “Brazil Trade†was a joke scenario that was bandied about on many of the trading desks that I have worked on in years past. Basically the story goes as follows: you pick your trades ahead of a set of economic releases, do them in huge size and with leverage, and then buy a one-way ticket to Rio de Janeiro and go to the airport. Leave one of the traders on the trading desk to watch the screens and the blotter. After the numbers release, you phone your desk from the airport to find out what happened (yes, this storyline involves communications technology that pre-dates the Blackberry, I-Pads, and proliferation of digital news screens). If your positions go onside big time, then you leave the airport go back to the desk in anticipation of a big bonus payout, and life continues as usual. If, alternatively, you blow up, you get on the plane and live off of your previously accumulated pelf in moderate confort on the beach in Rio. (The Nick Leeson / Barings debacle in 1994 was a criminal variant of the Brazil Trade that involved a luxury yacht.)

The bottom line of the Brazil Trade is thus simple: if you win the low probability bet; you win really big and life goes on as before and is even better; if you lose, life as you know it is over because you are now a fugitive living in purgatory.
Any prudent banker or trader knows that you need to blow the bad deals and bad trades out of your portfolio before the next cycle of profit making starts. However, the entire approach to crisis management in North America and Europe over the last three years has been to attempt a short circuit of this process and to foist the impression on the markets and the public that no reckoning or adjustment was or is needed in order for life to go on as before.
And, in implementing this vision of the way out of the crisis, vast amounts of taxpayer dollars have been put at risk.
Now the strategy is starting to fray in earnest. In Europe political support for the bailout strategy is faltering, Germany appears to be positioning for Greek default, while the other peripheral countries slip closer to the edge and major banks’ share prices plummet – short selling ban or no. The resignation in the last few months of two senior ECB officials – Juergen Stark and Axel Weber (note: Weber was the heir-apparent to Trichet over Draghi) – signals deep policy divisions at the Central Bank. For the policy hawks unfortunately, these two resignations represent a victory of the bailout-supportive policy doves and, most likely, a continuation of present ECB policies.
In the US the latest wheeze in the form of the Obama Jobs Plan signals just how far removed from the reality of the markets the policymakers and politicians there are. What of the recent bust up over the debt ceiling and the stated need of the Debt Reduction Super Committee to find $4 Trillion in cuts before the end of 2011? Apparently this does not matter any more – $450 billion will be spent on extending unemployment benefits and other transfers before consideration of the funding mechanism is settled. More fundamentally, in our opinion the whole package boils down to a “potluck†policy grab bag that can only incentivize the unemployed in the US to stay unemployed. If passed by Congress, it will not achieve anything meaningful outside of an increase in the US Federal debt.
Canada is not immune. Not only are our debt levels very high by international standards, the can has been kicked down the road by the authorities here while our economy remains vulnerable to accelerating slowdowns in the US, Europe and China. There should be no question, but that the de-risking of the economy here from exposure to another major credit event must be a policy priority. For the avoidance of doubt we are not advocating more stimulus (in fact the very opposite) but more active risk management of the Zombie situation and more predictable control over government finances at all levels of public administration.
We are in this unfortunate situation because the authorities in North America and Europe never encouraged the markets to make the needed adjustments three years ago. Had they let the markets find a solution and refrained from meddling:
 The eventual price tag would have been lower and much more predictable,
 Inflation risks would be less,
 Unemployment would be lower,
 The number of sovereign, corporate and banking zombies would be MUCH LOWER,
 Sovereign debt burdens would be MUCH LOWER,
 The risks of an uncontrolled debt deflation and credit market collapse would be MUCH LOWER,
 The economies of America and Europe would be recovering.
The rapidly escalating crisis has swept the outcome of last weekend’s G-7 in Marseilles into the dustbin along with the sports pages and classified ads. This week we have more policy and political meetings in Europe; and next week we have the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee in a two day meeting down on L Street. The markets are now saying a Greek default is inevitable, other countries and buisnesses are edging closer to the precipice and yet the policymakers continue to bang the same drums.
Is anyone packed for a long trip?
Posted in Bank Loans, Bankruptcy, Banks, Canada, Crisis, Crminal Activity, EU, Fed Policy, Loan Losses, Sovereign Debt, USA | No Comments »
July 22nd, 2011 Alex Jurshevski
 “The astonishment which I had first experienced on this discovery soon gave place to delight and rapture. After so much time spent in painful labor, to arrive at once at the summit of my desires, was the most gratifying consummation of my toils. But that this discovery was so great and overwhelming, that all the steps by which I had been progressively led to it were obliterated, and I beheld only the result. What had been the study and desire of the wisest men since the creation of the world was now within my grasp. Not that, like a magic scene, it all opened upon me at once: the information I had obtained was of a nature rather to direct my endeavors so soon as I should point them towards the object of my search, than to exhibit that object already accomplished. I was like the Arabian who had been buried with the dead, and found a passage to life, aided only by one glimmering, and seemingly ineffectual, light.â€
Mary Shelley’s  Frankenstein 1818
The passage above could easily have substituted for the press communiqué issued by the EU yesterday which laid down the agreement reached in Brussels regarding the European debt crisis and the measures adopted by lead Ministers to forestall contagion spreading from the PIIGS to other countries.

 Illustration from the “Frankenstein†edition published by Colburn and Bentley, London 1831. Public Domain.
The nuts and bolts of the bailout package according the that document are as follows:
       – There will be new financing in the amount of EUR109 Billion for Greece;
      – Loan rates on existing debt will be cut to 3.5% from as much 5.5% for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and maturities will be extended to 15 and as much as 30 years;
      – “Voluntary” private sector contribution to the Greek package would see creditors taking a haircut of 21 per cent. There would be no relief of this kind for Portugal or Ireland;
      – The EFSF and its successor the ESM (The EU bailout funds) will obtain new powers to intervene in national bond markets in Europe and to recapitalize banks, but only with the go-ahead of the ECB;
      – Greece will be given a “Marshall Plan†by the EU to help refloat its economy. Brussels is forming a team to help Greece administer the aid.
      – No mention was made of any need to address issues in any other EU countries or of any plans to increase the size of the bailout mechanism from the present EUR 440 Bn.
The voluntary private sector participation which will result in haircuts amounting to around EUR 37 Billion is expected to result in only a short technical default that therefore will not trigger default clauses in existing CDS contracts, thus averting the nightmare scenario.
Similar to Dr Frankenstein’s violation of every principle of medical ethics and morals involved in his grave-robbing and gruesome experimentation, by reaching this agreement the EU leadership has breached every principle on which the European Union was founded. On the kindest interpretation, this must be regarded as a measure of the desperation the EU leadership must have been feeling in the wake of recent market events and the growing levels of social unrest in a number of southern European countries.
While the intention is to provide this support only until Greece, Ireland and Portugal can re-finance themselves in private markets, the reality is that this new deal effectively gives those countries a commitment of indefinite support. What if other countries fall further into crisis and need to be bailed out? Will they end up with a Carte Blanche as well?
 The deal as announced does little to address the key issues and much of the detail appears not to have been fleshed out. The haircuts apply only to Greece, and even at that, are miles short of what the market has been signaling is really required (we estimate around 70%) and the interest rate subsidies do nothing to address the fact that they apply to mountains of accumulated debt that under the terms of the deal will not go away. How the rate fakery will play in Spain and Italy who are having to pay what the market demands is also not clear. There are now evermore committees involved in trying to operate on the patient. The extension of new powers to the managers of the bailout funds, who on their creation in early 2010 assured the markets that they would “never be used”, make them an easy mark for hedge funds who do not have to trade by committee……Watch this space.
 After the initial euphoria expressed by Dr Frankenstein, we all know how the story ends: the Monster kills a number of people in most horrible ways – including a child and Dr Frankenstein’s bride – causes the death of others, and then ends up committing suicide and dying a most horrible death in the frigid waters of the Arctic Ocean. The immoral abomination is fated to die a grisly death from the moment of its creation.
This monstrous deal will suffer a similar fate, and not too far down the road.
Posted in Bank Loans, Bankruptcy, Bond Market, Crisis, EU, Loan Losses, Restructuring, Sovereign Debt | No Comments »
July 12th, 2011 Alex Jurshevski
“When the blind lead the blind, both will fall in the waterâ€
Old Chinese Proverb
In the last several months a number of politicians have been calling for a “firewall†to be erected between the PIIGS and the rest of Europe and the world that would stand in the way of the spread of financial contagion.
These clarion calls miss the point: Contagion is already here by virtue of the interconnectedness of financial markets generally, and the central role played by the European Central Bank in backstopping each national banking market in Europe.
Not only are the limitations of the ECB arrangements becoming clear, the reality is now dawning on European bankers, politicians and policymakers that their efforts to contain the Greek, Irish and Portuguese debt problems have to date succeeded in only making the scale of the problems larger and render the probable outcome from this mess far more likely to involve a far more costly meltdown than would otherwise have been the case.
 
In the last year scarcely a month has gone by without the ECB announcing some kind of easement in its collateral rules thus enabling it to continue supplying liquidity to banks in the PIIGS and keep those Governments able to pay bills. Unfortunately this has only come at the cost of polluting its balance sheet with junk rated debt and vastly magnified the consequential risks and damages to its own solvency, and to its credibility as a central bank. [In March 2010 we downloaded the Operations Handbook of the ECB from its website. It shows that the lowest rated collateral asset accepted by the ECB back then must have been rated at least single "A" by at least two major credit rating agencies. That document is available from us on request. As for the risk protocols today? Please read  Trichet's comments immediately below.]
In a related development, Jean Claude Trichet, the ECB President said that with Portugal now under the umbrella of the IMF and EU bailout, that the ECB would not seek minimum ratings requirements for Portuguese debt “until further noticeâ€. The esteemed M. Trichet said that this was meant to remove “an element of pro-cyclicality on ratings agency announcements.†And in further reaction to the ratings agencies downgrading of Portugal, he stated that “a small oligopolistic ratings structure is probably not what is probably desirable at the level of global financeâ€Â Zut, alors!! Plus ca change!!
We are now awaiting M. Trichet’s reaction to the Moody’s downgrade of Ireland to “junk” status that was just announced today.
A few days ago, Bloomberg told us, that in an effort to stem deteriorating bond prices and escalating CDS spreads “European lawmakers voted in favor of a ban on short selling of government bonds in the EU unless traders have at least ‘located and reserved’ in advance the securities they intend to sell. The European Union Parliament in Strasbourg, France, also called for restrictions on traders’ use of credit-default swaps to profit from defaults on sovereign debt they don’t own.†The politicians apparently believe that If you don’t like what markets are telling you, then you should simply change the rules and paper over the inconvenient truths.
In the last 10 days revelations that the French plan to “re-profile†Greek debts would not pass the ratings agencies definitions of default provided further evidence that this is a problem that is growing like Topsy, but that is lacking a champion to tackle it. Anyone who has previously been involved in these kind of problem situations will recognize the importance of discussing these types of proposals with all affected parties – especially the ratings agencies – prior to approaching the market with any announcements. Clearly this was not done in this case, illustrating the lack of foresight, planning and communications protocols involved at the very highest levels of the decision-making structure.
Investors in Periperal EU sovereign debt issues, bank shares and short dated European bank paper have been flocking from those markets in droves, fearing the worst. Spanish and Italian CDS spreads have spiked to their highest levels since the creation of the Euro. The remaining PIIGS cannot fund in the open market.
Shares of European banks have dived, particularly in the PIIGS and the market is now fixating on the massive and looming debt rollover profiles of all European countries, but particularly the PIIGS.
These examples of recent developments amply illustrate that the entire debacle has so far featured “problem solving by committee†(and that no one on this “committee†has likely ever had to fund any portfolio or trade any assets – ever). Not surprisingly, the outcomes have been predictable.
The more the ECB compromises its balance sheet and the longer the EU/ECB/IMF Troika continues to insist that its remedies be applied in doctrinaire fashion, then the closer this crisis edges towards the inevitable blow-up and, it seems, towards an unwelcome event that will be far larger than any default may have produced a year ago. As a sidebar to illustrate this point in the case of Greece, whereas a haircut of 20% may have sufficed a year ago, now a write-down of at least 70% is probably required.
And finally, the EFSF is tapped out and its remaining resources are insufficient to fund another country meltdown. The authorities have blown the heavy artillery on a set of smaller problems, have failed to cure or contain them, and do not have sufficient firepower left in terms of Balance Sheet and Credibility to tackle what is now clearly coming down the track.
Leaderless. Aimless. Europe is about to take a dunking.
 ————-
“There is no Plan B to avoid defaultâ€
Olli Rehn EU Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner
* “Roach Motel” is a trademark of the Black Flag Corporation. Amongst traders, it also denotes a transaction structure that is impossible to get out of without losing a significant amount of money.
Posted in Bank Loans, Banks, Crisis, EU, IMF, Sovereign Debt | No Comments »
May 16th, 2011 Alex Jurshevski
This past weekend we came across two really interesting items while reading the New York Times.
One was an op-ed by Paul Krugman that we actually happen to side with. In it, Krugman writes about the “Unwisdom (sic) of Elites†in terms of the reasons that the policies that got us into the financial mess in the US were more typically a product of narrow self interest of policy elites than demands by the public at large. It was this narrow self interest of the elites, according to Krugman, that got the US into trouble, so it is no use blaming the electorate for asking for “tax and spend” policies that pumped up real estate and the financial markets before the inevitable bust occurred three years ago.
In this connection, Krugman would do well to heed his own counsel in the matter of negotiating an exit from ruinous debt-based problems by continuing to recommend elitist solutions that pile on more debt.
…….Which brings us to the next gem that we found nestled in the pages of the venerable old paper; namely, the arrest of IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn at JFK Airport on charges of attempted rape and forcible confinement of a hotel chambermaid. This is not the first of such peccadilloes that have marked the career of this man. Indeed before the ink was dry on that story another woman had come forward with stories of unwelcome advances by the IMF’s top dog. Strauss-Kahn was denied bail at a hearing today.
Â
The irony of this situation is not lost on many as the cartoon would indicate. It is the IMF together with its partner-in-arms, the ECB which has most strongly resisted any talk of restructuring debts for any Euro-zone countries. Today, ECB Economics Chief Juergen Stark even took to the airwaves to denounce any suggestion of restructuring as something that would inflict “massive harm†on the Euro-zone.
To us, it seems that the European authorities are again reverting to type. A year ago, the EU Sovereign Debt problem was “solved†with the creation of the EFSF (which would “never be needed†according to the ECB at the time). Then as the need for action became more obvious, massive bailout loans were forced onto a variety of countries. [The one exception here was Iceland which was all set to take on vast new debts in obeisance to the ECB and IMF until Recovery Partners addressed the issue directly with the Government there. The IMF / Nordic loan package was never closed and Iceland today is recovering albeit slowly and without the millstone of additional debt. The Icesave settlement has been pushed off as we had also earlier advised the Althingi to do.]
And, after the loan packages were doled out to the over-indebted countries, they were proclaimed healthy again by the EU honchos.
Now as the vacuity of this policy response is becoming clear, clarion calls denouncing restructuring of the debts are once again being mounted in order to avert any losses being pushed back onto the lending banks.
There is no way out of a debt problem by adding more debt to the mix. The unfortunate history here is that the IMF is an extremely creditor-friendly institution, as is the ECB. Their constituency consists in part of the largest banks in the world, and it is because of that, that these institutions are reluctant to recommend any policies that would act against the interests of these constituents, that a strict “no haircut†stance has been maintained by both.
The reality is that the debt problem in the EU is far from over. It is related as much to the lack of a framework of institutional bailout arrangements and enforcement mechanisms within the EU as it is to bad borrowing decisions by EU governments as well as bad lending decisions by Euro-zone banks. Eventually the piper will have to be paid. And, as we have observed in the past, the history of Governments under austerity succeeding in cutting back debt on a sustained basis is not encouraging. Moreover, the people of the EU have no desire to effectively become permanent tax slaves of the banks.
The impact of Mr Strauss-Kahn’s arrest on the ongoing debt talks in the EU is likely not going to have a material effect on the outcomes here. John Lipsky will do just as good a job in delivering the party line this week, and a permanent successor to Strauss-Kahn will soon be found. Over time however, the reality that some EU Governments are going to need more than just more debt and that  EU banks are going to have to take a chop and likely be restructured themselves (in certain cases) will assert itself.
Recognizing that many of the lending decisions that led to the current situation were bad is the only way that we can begin to dig our way out of this situation. The sooner that this happens, the better.
In the meantime, the important thing for those countries in debt difficulties is to ensure that they obtain timely, high-quality advice and have robust crisis management plans in place that will enable an exit from these problems with a miinimum of stress and social upheaval.Â
Posted in Bank Loans, Banks, Crisis, EU, IMF, Restructuring | No Comments »
March 29th, 2011 Alex Jurshevski
‘I can’t believe that!‘ said Alice. Â
 ‘Can’t you?’ the Queen said in a pitying tone. ‘Try again: draw a long breath, and shut your eyes.’
 Alice laughed. ‘There’s no use trying,’ she said  ’one can’t believe impossible things.’
 ‘I daresay you haven’t had much practice,’ said the Queen. ‘When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast. ‘
 
Wow!! What a Week! What a Month! What a Year so far!
The plethora of unexpected events witnessed in the last few months has been nothing short of remarkable. These include spiralling revolutions in the Middle East, Natural Disasters and Nuclear leaks in Japan, NATO airborne assaults on behalf of Libyan rebels and the still slow burning fuses attached to public finance debt bombs in the US, Japan and Europe.
Through it all, global currency, equity and fixed interest markets have remained remarkably placid and well-supported. The VIX index is in fact not registering fear of any kind.
Shouldn’t we be asking ourselves whether the markets’ faith in the future reflects far too rosy an interpretation of the developments and probable outcomes in key economies? Could the markets be setting themselves up for another big dump? To this end we present our “Top Six†hit parade of impossible beliefs held by the markets currently. Let’s take a closer look:
The Top Six Impossible Beliefs Â
- The Chinese Economy is not in a Bubble
- The Japanese Disasters will not threaten Global or US Economic Prospects
- Large Banks in Europe and the US are solvent
- The Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe is under control
- The US Fiscal situation is under control
- There will be no more QE after QE2
We are not optimistic that today’s lawmakers and policymakers have the skill, inclination or fortitude to handle the pressing issues that require due care and attention. Expect co-ordinated QE, know that we are already on the path to high inflation, and expect at least another one or two of these situations to go sideways and precipitate another financial crisis within the event horizons shown below.
The Sorry Details Start Here
(1) There is remarkable complacency over the stability of the Chinese economy. “According to an economic outlook report from an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) business advisory body, China’s economy is expected to remain strong in 2011 and 2012, but inflationary pressures are likely to rise further due to rising food prices.â€
Most commentators do not look behind the numbers. If they did then what they might find as regards the sustainability and quality of Chinese economic growth might give them some pause. We only consider two issues: significant mal-investment; and the cost to China’s economy of GDP growth in terms of externalities such as pollution and desertification.
Can people with bad haircuts and clad in cheap suits (ie: government bureaucrats) make better decisions than the market? Apparently this is what Chinese central planners think. Maybe this is why they have set out plans to build millions of new housing units, and yes even entire cities, in the absence of market demand . Perhaps that is why at last count there were 64 million unoccupied housing units in China with more under construction. Entire cities have been built that now stand completely empty. Why the empty units? Consider the fact that many experts believe that Chinese property prices may have outstripped purchasing power by up to 70%.
Now consider that adjusted for population, relative housing prices and the size of the economy, that the Chinese housing overhang described above is about 2-3 times larger than the deplorable residential housing market situation in the US. This does not take into account the mal-investments in infrastructure and coimmercial real estate that have accompanied the housing developments. Is it not probable that there are some serious non-performing loan problems at Chinese banks as a consequence? Is it also not surprising that in recent days that Jiang Jianqing, the Chairman of ICBC, one of China’s four main lenders was protesting that the $100 Bn of lending to local authorities that his bank undertook does not represent a threat to his bank’s stability?
This is only one example of egregious mal-investment by the Chinese government and the state-owned banks. There is an ample supply of others.
Then consider this report, which reveals the fact that Chinese desertification may take over three hundred years to reverse Another study conducted by the OECD also spells out the scale and severity of the ecological crisis now engulfing the country, poisoning its people and holding it back economically. Over 400 million people drink contaminated water every day. Seventy five per cent of lakes rivers and the near oceans are polluted and toxic. Taken together, the externalities of desertification and pollution effectively negate China’s 10% economic growth rate, leaving it no better off each year, facing a large and growing clean up bill, a sickened population  and in urgent need of new sources of clean water.
The problem for China is that if it stops growing increased social unrest will result. If it addresses the issues of mal-investment and economic externalities it must stop growing. However if it does not stop the externalities from accumulating and stop investing in redundant plant, equipment and real estate development, then the bubble will pop anyways, resulting in social unrest.Â
Catch-22 ?
Event Horizon : Chinese Bubble Pops. Zero to three years.
(2) According to the Washington Times and most other news outlets, the Japanese Earthquake is unlikely to threaten Global growth or affect the US. In fact, in recent days more than two thirds of the news reporting out of Japan has focused on the nuclear situation at the Fukushima reactor site. The bulk of the remainder of the reporting has focused on the plight of the locals. These reports stress that the worst thing to fear from the Japanese natural disaster is the threat of nuclear contamination. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact this misplaced focus by the amusement park media completely ignores all of the science on nuclear radiation that has been accumulated since the Chernobyl disaster.
To be sure, there are several stories here which bear mentioning here. As per the foregoing, the first is that the nuke contamination fears are completely overblown. The second is that the Japanese have done a remarkable job of getting control of a huge disaster in a very short span of time and with little outside help. Compare and contrast to Hurricane Katrina and the more recent BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Both instances featured an abdication of responsibility at the Presidential level, a failure to identify the problem and apply solutions in a timely manner and almost zero accountability among the officials involved. Countless billions were wasted through mismanagement and corruption in the USA. Not so in Japan.
The real problem issues with the Japan disaster is that it has severely hurt that economy and the ability of many of its top companies to contribute specialized goods into the global supply chain and to meet growth and  earnings targets. What many folks do not know is that most large factories in Japan have thousands of “Mom and Pop†suppliers who sometimes work out of garages and improvised workshops in residential areas. It is too early to tell how many of these suppliers are even still in existence,  and the effect that their disappearance might have on the likes of Sony, Mitsubishi and Toyota.
In addition, the disaster places even more stress on the public finances of Japan as tax revenues will be lower than forecast, support costs for the public relief effort are going to be enormous along with an estimated $250-300 billion price tag for the reconstruction. The other issue of course is how this reconstruction is to be financed. Japan has almost $3.0 Trillion of net foreign assets but it is unlikely that it will liquidate these to support reconstruction. US and European political pressure will more probably dictate that Japan finance this through a QE merry go round which will see the yen Money Supply pumped up in order to accommodate JGB issuance from the Ministry of Finance.
The bottom line is that Global Growth will suffer and Japan’s balance sheet will be further stressed by additional dollops of Zombie Finance.
Event Horizon: Â Weak Japanese growth. Deterioration in public finances. Zero to three years
(3) Banks in Europe and the US are solvent. This past Friday the Federal Reserve announced that certain banks among the 19 tested were allowed to increase their dividends only if they passed “stress tests†conducted by the Federal Reserve to see if their balance sheets were strong enough to weather another recession. The Fed said it had completed those tests and expects that “some†banks will increase or resume dividend payments, buy back shares or repay government capital. The Fed did not reveal the names or number of banks that are expected to do so. Notable for their absence from the list were Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp., the nation’s largest bank.
The Fed singled out the two “Too Big To Fail†institutions and whacked them on the wrist. Big Deal.
The elephant in the room in all of this is the absence of any discussion of mark-to-market accounting treatment for ANY bank portfolios. Recall that mark-to-market accounting was abolished by the Fed and US regulators in April 2009. The latest wheeze by the US regulators and central bank is thus nothing more than a scheme to lure more investors to put money into bank shares and for banks to pay out money to institutional investors hungry for cash such as pension funds, insurers and mutual funds by pretending that all is well. Of course, bank executives also get to line their pockets as a result of this decision. The money to pay the dividends is, of course, freshly minted by Dr Bernanke acting as agent for the US Treasury and his member bank shareholders.
 Similarly, the European regulators have announced another round of stress tests upcoming in order to achieve the same result with the markets ie: “Nothing to see here. Move along. Move alongâ€. Here again the methodology leaves us more than a little short of endorsing the robustness of the entire procedure. Some stresses such as interest rate and equity market stresses, look a little light. But the killer is that again regulators are not permitting any consideration of sovereign default or restructuring.
 Are all of the big banks solvent? Unlikely!!
 Event Horizon: Large US or European Bank Fails. Zero to 18 months (see below)
(4) The Sovereign Debt Crisis is Europe is under control. March has featured a summit marathon for the EU and euro area. Since the version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) currently in force does not admit a permanent anti-crisis mechanism, the EU Member States must agree on a Treaty amendment. Two sentences are to be added to Article 136 TFEU with effect from January 1, 2013. As of that date euro area countries will be allowed to install a permanent stabilisation mechanism granting financial assistance with conditions attached. The other issues that were discussed include amendment of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) as part of the existing crisis mechanism; how the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) is to be fleshed out as successor to the EFSF and financial aid from the Commission; and an economic governance package.
Consequently, for the past month European leaders have been meeting in order to address these amendments to the EU governance matters and concerns regarding the stability of heavily indebted member nations. The process is designed to allay concerns that the Euro is under threat and that certain EU countries may default and walk away from the obligations. The concerns of the politicians are well founded. Look at the chart below. This is what has been giving Cameron, Merkel, Sarkozy, King and Trichet sleepless nights. If any one of the European Sovereign borrowers defaults and walks away, then the banks that have lent all that money will face significant capital issues.
| Â |
Cross Border EU Debt – Selected Countries |
 |
| Â |
 |
(USD millions)Â |
 |
 |
 |
| Â |
Portugal |
Ireland |
Italy |
Greece |
Spain |
 |
| Â |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| Britain |
$24
|
$189
|
$77
|
$15
|
$114
|
 |
| Â |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| France |
$45
|
$60
|
$511
|
$75
|
$220
|
 |
| Â |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| Germany |
$47
|
$184
|
$190
|
$45
|
$238
|
 |
| Â |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| Total owed to “Big 3″ |
$116
|
$433
|
$778
|
$135
|
$572
|
 |
| Â |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
| Overall Total Debt |
$286
|
$867
|
$1,400
|
$236
|
$1,100
|
 |
| Debt / GDP |
75.20%
|
63.70%
|
115.20%
|
108.10%
|
59.50%
|
 |
| * Countries in the top row owe the amounts to countries in the vertical column.        Gross debt and debt to GDP ratios are in the two bottom rows. |
| Â Source: BIS |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
For this and other reasons the entire EU restructuring process has been conceived and is being managed in order to AVOID ANY HAIRCUTS and to pass the cost of lending excesses on to taxpayers of the various countries involved. This process involves the imposition of austerity measures, the requirement that countries accept bailout monies, the requirement that they must cede a portion of their sovereignty and agree that there are no reductions in the amounts owing.
The unravelling of this scheme is only just beginning. The EFSF is inadequate, ill-conceived; and has been ill-managed. This week saw renewed riots in the UK prompted by austerity measures, strikes against user fees in Greece and the fall of the government in Portugal. Moreover the escalation in market rates for the debt of the various Zombie Nations is in most cases already at levels that will not permit the continued economic rollover of obligations as they come due.
The fuse on this debt bomb has long been lit and there is still no competent UXB team in sight.
Event Horizon: EU area debtor country defaults and demands haircuts. Zero to 18 months
(5) US Fiscal prospects are being capably managed. As the US military was launching over 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles at pro-Quadaffi targets in Libya, Obama was to be found on his way to South America for a five day junket through the region, in part “to secure jobs for Americansâ€. Obama couldn’t have gone to better place. Both Brazil and Chile, two of the countries on his itinerary, sport lower unemployment rates than does the US; and better economic prospects. Perhaps Obama plans to subsidize the emigration of the US unemployed to South America:  Fly to Rio courtesy of Uncle Sam. Enjoy the Beach. The Feds will pick up the tab of moving you and your family as long as you never come back. We are sure that all of this could be done for less than $50,000 per household. This figure is about one tenth the cost of the last big stimulus program launched by this Administration. A bargain at the price.
All kidding aside; the fiscal crisis that is engulfing US Government finances shows every sign of accelerating, not in the least because Democrats at every level of Government are refusing to acknowledge the need for fiscal restraint of any kind. Red ink is also killing Municipal and State finances. The latest monthly Government deficit number for the Feds at over $220 Billion is in nosebleed territory. Not only does Obama not even want to secure agreement of a symbolic $100 Billion of budget cuts; the US Government is no longer even pretending to have any sort of fiscal discipline in place at all. The Federal Government is operating with no official budget and is coming up fast against the debt ceiling. (As a line item, Obama had no fiscal authority to order military units to support the operation in Libya. Under the continuing resolution which is in place until April 8th, the only funded war-fighting operations are in Iraq, Afghanistan and Central Asia.)
It appears that under any circumstances forecasted by the CBO, the CEA or the US Treasury that Trillion plus dollar deficits will continue indefinitely; in combination with the $50 Trillion or so in unfunded but known liabilities, this makes any discussion of imposing fiscal discipline a round table on Fantasy Finance.
Event Horizon: US fiscal problems cause investor revolt and downgrade. Zero to 36 months
(6) Widespread market expectations point to no renewal of QE after the current round (QE2) ends in June. In fact several Fed Governors have gone on record saying that QE2 is the last QE. We have explained the real reasons for QE in a previous post. Although advertised as stimulus for the economy, the reality behind QE has in fact little to do with stimulus and much, much more to do with the gaping deficits at the Fed, an insolvent Banking system and Washington’s fiscal deficit which can no longer be properly funded in the open market. Nothing has changed since the time of that analysis to cause us to alter our opinion. In fact, recent events in Japan and Europe now argue even more strongly for a continuation of this program.
Even before the disaster that struck Japan, she and other foreign investors were quietly paring back on their purchases of Treasury Bonds and Notes. The entire volume of new supply has in fact been entirely taken up by the Fed through its QE operations. At this point the Feds have two alternatives: they can stop QE and bet that markets will continue to absorb Treasuries at yields that are quite arguably far below actual (rather than reported) inflation. Or the Feds can continue with QE and try to continue to maintain the fiction that everything is fine: the recovery is on track, jobs are being created and inflation is under control.
These choices amount to the following: choice (1) means that the Feds  admit to the problems, stop the fantasy finance of QE, clean up insolvent banks, implement swingeing cuts in public expenditures; and then take the associated economic pain which would be followed by renewed, durable growth. Or under choice (2) the politicians avoid the hard alternatives, continue promising bread and circuses to the public and hope that they (the politicians) can retire with an inflation-indexed pension before the economic firestorm starts.
The stark reality is that there is no politician of any stripe that would opt for choice (1) at the present time. This would be political suicide.
The path of least resistance therefore is to continue kicking the can down the road. US leaders, like the Europeans, Chinese and Japanese don’t have the courage to promote AND implement painful, but necessary adjustments. QE will continue because the default position for not only the US but for Europe, China and Japan is that the solution to the solvency issues amongst banks and sovereigns lies in inflating away the value of the debts and bad assets. The alternative of making good on debts and paying them off in full in a low-growth, low-inflation world is simply not a credible prospect when one looks at the finances of Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Japan the United States and other countries.
In the case of the United States we calculate that an increase of between 8 and 12 times the current price level is required to bring Government debt ratios and debt servicing capacities  back into balance. This means that we are likely looking at an inflationist program that lasts at least until QE6 (assuming that the size and duration of the operations match QE2). The path of least resistance for other cebtral banks is to accomodate. Thus,  US inflation will be exported worldwide and will likely be the last hurrah for the USD as the principle reserve currency. Â
Clearly, the central, glaring risk of this strategy is that the money printing and increases in bond supply will result in pressure on term rates and a subsequent financial meltdown in many countries due to debt servicing shortfalls and balky issuance markets. While the authorities will make every effort to forestall this development, rising interest rates are inevitable and will be the final nail in the coffin for those countries burdened with aging populations; extravagant entitlements programs, shrinking tax revenues, high unemployment, a sluggish economy and a political class unwilling or unable to make the correct choices. Savers, retirees and other owners of capital will be decimated by persistent and elevated levels of inflation unless they take protective actions soon.
Event Horizon: QE3…QE6+. QE3 starts in 3-5 months
End Notes
We are not optimistic that today’s lawmakers and policymakers have the skill, inclination or fortitude to handle the pressing issues that require due care and attention. Expect co-ordinated QE, know that we are already on the path to high inflation, and expect at least another one or two of these situations to go sideways and precipitate another financial crisis within the event horizons shown.
  [Courtesy of Leonard Cohen, follow this link to a track that will make our communal descent into inflationary dystopia a little easier to bear.]
Posted in Bank Loans, Bankruptcy, Banks, Crisis, EU, Fed Policy, Loan Losses, Middle East, Sovereign Debt | No Comments »
February 24th, 2011 Alex Jurshevski
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” George Santayana
There is a direct connection between the banks, legislative changes and directors’ and officers’ insurance premiums. Relaxation of regulation and poor policies and procedures intensified and increased the losses associated with the S&L Scandal of the 1980’s and early 1990’s. But just enough time passed since then to give decision makers the excuse to forget the lessons learned from that sorry episode. Not surprisingly all of the same issues have resurfaced prior to the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) thereby contributing to the causes of the GFC and importantly to the failure of US Banks so far and the extremely weakened condition of the entire banking sector.
The FDIC provides a chronology of S&L events on their website, and in a book,. These should be made mandatory reading for every employee of every bank, insurance company, rating agency, securities dealer, accounting firm and law firm. There are at least of few people in every level of a company who can smell a problem long before the executives are willing to do anything about it. And now, those employees can even profit from this knowledge. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, signed into law on July 21, 2010, includes a provision SEC. 21F, called “SECURITIES WHISTLEBLOWER INCENTIVES AND PROTECTIONâ€. This provision looks to incent whistleblowers with an award of 10% to 30% of the monetary sanction over $1 million. Therefore, if one were to take the average cost of the top six most recent FCPA settlements and multiply by the lowest award, it would means a $47 million compensatory windfall to the employee who blows the whistle on these bosses.
The FDIC book on the S&L scandal suggests that total FDIC recovery from 1986 through 1996 from professional liability suits was $5.1 billion (outside counsel costs were $1 billion – ie a significant incentive for lawsuits), with $1.3 billion of that coming from D&O claims, and, surprisingly, only $300 million from fidelity bond insurers. The account does not specifically say that the D&O recovery was from insurance policies, but there is no doubt that these insured losses were material to the insurance industry.
In those days, Insured vs. Insured exclusions, and trustee/regulator exclusions and limited severability were much more common in the D&O policy. And, the policies were not as heavily extended to cover loss of the corporate entity, and other parties and matters, as they are today. Also unique to that period was the length of time that D&O insurers had to prepare for potential loss. A noticeable uptick in bank failures was identifiable as early as 1982, but the actual assets losses and deposit insurance losses were not material until 1988. The period of 1997 through 2007 saw so few bank failures that the slate was wiped clean as if the past never existed. But this time, the asset losses and deposit insurance losses, which, in the 1980’s took seven years to develop, happened in one year. And these losses occurred on the basis of only the modest increase in the number of banks that the FDIC, Fed, Treasury and the OCC have so far made public.
Therefore, with the speed of the recent downturn, the larger average size of the failed banks, the broader policy wordings (more coverage for the corporate entity), and the resources of plaintiff counsel, it might ultimately be impossible to compare the S&L debacle with the GFC.
NERA Economic Consulting released their “Failed Bank Litigation Report†in August 2010, providing a lot of details comparing and contrasting the S&L with recent bank failures, including the resulting D&O and Professional Liability litigation. The first part of the report presents statistics on recent bank failures and the characteristics of their assets, loan portfolios and performance relative to banks that have not failed. The remainder of the report discusses failure factors and litigation in both periods.
This becomes an even more interesting having read Recovery Partners’ blog entitled “Hubris Meets Nemesisâ€, which estimates that “…the number of insolvent and/or severely impaired banks in the US to be well over 2000 institutionsâ€, and goes on to point out that the suspension of FASB 157 (“the abolition of “mark-to market†accounting”)  and the failure to activate the Prompt Corrective Action Law. is hiding the true extent of the deterioration in bank balance sheets in the US.  If this analysis is in the ballpark, that will mean that the GFC hit in the US will vastly eclipse the losses from the S&L scandal. Of the 2,912 bank failures from 1980 to 1994, many were private and a lot smaller than the average failure today. It has been suggested that the scandal crisis cost over $150 billion and represented 3% of US GDP. Today, $150 billion is the cost to ‘bailout’ one insurer. According to the DandO Diary blog, there have been 118 bank failures in 2010, and 165 in two full previous years. Recovery Partners estimates that the Deposit Insurance Fund losses from the GFC are currently in the range of some $500 to $700 billion. See also Chris Whalen’s Institutional Risk Analytics website for similar views on this issue.
The FDIC is starting to sue failed bank directors and outside professionals. FDIC filed two separate lawsuits in the Northern District of Georgia against outside law firms for the failed Integrity Bank of Alpharetta, Georgia. FDIC filed a separate suit against former directors and officers of Integrity Bank. They provide an updated list of failed banks on their website, and a separate list of authorized suits against individual directors and officers.
FDIC litigation in the S&L period was the primary source of litigation. Today the follow-on claims in private litigation by investors and creditors, and criminal proceeding by the DoJ, are very creative in order to avoid FDIC priorities and onerous pleading requirements (scienter hurdle of 10(b)-5.) This could mean that private litigation could cause even more “insured†loss than the FDIC. The “Failed Banks†topic section of the DandO Diary, provides significant detail and resources on the primary claims, third party professional claims, and on follow-on civil litigation.
The Canadians in this group are not insulated from this issue. A majority of the market share of D&O insurance premium written in this country is by insurers who are exposed to US claims. Even if they are not directly writing Bank D&O policies, bank failures affect the lawyers, accountants, pension and investment fund investors, and the ‘bricks, clicks and mortar’ companies who rely on these banks. There has been a flight to safety for insurers, and that is why we have more than 27 companies writing directors’ and officers’ liability insurance in Canada. Every one of theses firms will have difficulty avoiding the direct and/or reinsurance costs of US losses in spite of the fact that insurance companies typically spread theor risks across all of their insureds, whether these insureds are inter-listed, large public, private or non-profit companies.
In addition to the direct and indirect US exposures, Canada is seeing a material change in homegrown loss experience. The decision in the IMAX class action securities case, was a denial of the defendant’s motion for leave to appeal the K.van Rensburg J. decision to certify class proceedings. We all know what happens to settlement amounts when a court decision goes in favour of the plaintiff class. The underlying securities litigation commenced September 20, 2006, when Siskinds LLP,  and Stutts, Strosberg LLP, brought their case alleging misrepresentation and breach of duty of care. This was the first case to be brought under Ontario’s new, at the time, “Bill 198â€, aka, part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act (the “Actâ€), section 138.3, which provides a statutory cause of action for secondary market misrepresentation.
The insurance implication is that the IMAX 2005 information circular listed a D&O policy with a $70 million limit of liability. The circular does not provide a lot of detail, and I am not privy to any inside information, but it does say they had a split deductible of $100,000 “for each claim under the policy other than claims made under U.S. securities law as to which a deductible of $500,000 appliesâ€, and paid an annual premium of $962,240.
There is no regulation of D&O or E&O policy wordings in Canada, and there are hundreds of versions of policy wordings, applications and endorsements that can mean the difference between coverage and personal financial loss. In the IMAX case, the split deductible (and the level of premium) would suggest that the policy provided at least some level of coverage for the separate and distinct loss of the corporate entity. If this policy structure, or an undisclosed policy, did not include a separate limit of liability for individual directors and officers, and their non-indemnified claims, then this $70 million is subject to erosion or even full exhaustion by loss incurred by the corporation.
Unfortunately, most directors and officers make a critical assumption that their D&O policy is designed to cover their personal liability. For many directors and executives, this “sharing of limits†problem is only identified after a lawsuit has been launched. The confusion is that this extension is marketed as “securities coverageâ€, which can be misleading to the individual directors. Some insurance brokers have sold this coverage by suggesting it is the only way to get coverage for claims brought by shareholders. Such a statement is absolutely false. The traditional D&O policy was always meant to apply to claims brought by shareholders, but only those claims brought against individual insured persons, not those brought against the corporation.Â
Much more information on Canadian securities class actions can be found in the NERA report, here.
With a relatively small premium base, when compared with the personal and commercial property and casualty market, the specialty casualty insurance marketplace can be materially affected by isolated industry events. Even within this isolated industry (if you can call US Banks an isolated industry) there was a significant historical learning opportunity. With the degree of correlation between contributing factors of the S&L event and the recent bank failures, it is not a stretch to suggest the S&L learning opportunity was completely ignored by far too many decision makers.
If the horse has already left the barn, (which, based on D&O losses to date, has not been determined), then there are two things to do: First, identify and mitigate the current and ongoing risks of this event; and then identify the contributing factors (and people) and take appropriate notice and initiate action, so the market can retain this information and use it to avoid similar situations in the future.
Based on, 1) larger bank asset losses, 2) larger FDIC losses, 3) higher D&O policy limits and broader wordings, 4) deeper pockets in the executive ranks, 5) a new profit incentive to blow the whistle to regulators and the media (and not report concerns to the audit committee and independent board members), 6) the motivation of significant plaintiff lawyer contingency damage awards, and 7) an increase in follow-on civil litigation, insured losses will increase and the risk of D&O and Professional Liability insurance premium increases and coverage limitations is therefore extremely material.
Policy expiry dates, market swings and claims rush forward very quickly. Therefore, timing is crucial. All directors, executives, officers, compliance and legal staff, and other outside professionals should be doing the following:
1)Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Request a personal contractual indemnity agreement from the corporation or partnership. Indemnification provisions are built into the Canadian Business Corporations Act, the Ontario Business Corporations Act, many corporate by-laws, and into most of industry specific acts, but, they are not all created equal, and none of them are as good as a well vetted individual contractual indemnity;
2)            Recognize that D&O insurance is not a panacea. It should not be a priority over good commercial general liability, property or operation specific products, like professional liability, errors and omissions liability (“E&Oâ€), environmental, fidelity/crime, and cyber/media/privacy insurance policies. D&O is also not a priority over good governance, risk management and compliance (GRC) activities;
3)Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Know the expiry dates of all policies. Notice I did not say renewal dates, because a D&O/Fidelity/E&O renewal is never guaranteed;
4)            Know your “notice†obligations and opportunities to report claims and “circumstances†to the insurers and trigger your current policy for future loss (no matter when that claim is eventually launched;
5)            Have your broker identify all areas of “limits sharing†within your policies. Limit sharing is very sneaky, because it is not isolated to an insuring agreement; it can be found in the applications (which forms part of the policy,) exclusions, allocation provisions, severability provisions, and even in the definitions;
6)Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Treat the D&O purchase decision as it being based on the limit liability, not on the insurance premium. The limit of liability has, or should have, a value that is material to the corporation, often the premium does not. Even for a small non-profit, it is a one or two million dollar decision; for a small publicly traded company it is a five to twenty five million dollar decision; and for a large public company it can be a $100 million decision. The purchase decision deserves this level of attention; and,
7)            Examine the skill, ability and independence of your broker (not just your brokerage.) There are far too many brokers who are passing themselves off as experienced, when in fact they have limited or no direct experience with D&O policies and claims. There are also many brokers who marketed (even convince) themselves they are independent, even when they owned by, or have a material debt or non-standard remuneration agreement with, an insurance company. It is therefore appropriate to, a) request full disclosure of ownership and all potential conflicts of interest, including any “exclusive insurer†programs, b) ask all brokers to explain to your satisfaction the key issues regarding all coverage options as they relate to your operations, and, c) request of all brokers not approach any insurance markets on your behalf until you have made your choice of broker.
Through aggressive competition among insurance companies and under-educated and overzealous insurance brokers, policies have been “broadened†to such an extent that they are now a possible detriment to the appointment of directors. Claims made against the corporate entity and coverage for non-traditional parties and matters are now fair game under many D&O policies. This level of coverage can be very attractive to aggressive plaintiffs, and their even more attractive to aggressive plaintiff’s lawyers, because a broader policy means a better chance for at least a modest settlement. A modest settlement reduces the down-side risk of pursuing what might be a long-shot chance of discovering a smoking gun that will produce the home run settlement (entire policy limits, plus corporate contribution, plus third party contribution, plus individual director and officer contribution.) However, there is only one limit of liability that will be shared by all parties for all claims.
We have yet to see how US bank failures will play-out for D&O insurance buyers, but given what we already know, it behooves executives, directors, corporate risk managers and their advisors to meet this issue proactively and forcefully.
This is a guest blog by Greg Shields, a Partner and commercial insurance broker with Mitchell Sandham Insurance Services in Toronto, specializing in D&O, E&O and Fidelity insurance. His blog posts can be found at http://mitchellsandham.wordpress.com/, and he can be reached directly at gshields@mitchellsandham.com, or at 416 862-5626.
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