April 30th, 2009 Alex Jurshevski
”The last duty of a central banker is to tell the public the truth.” Alan Blinder, Fed Vice Chairman
We are sure that if Professor Blinder had known what was coming down the tracks, that he would never have made the foregoing comment on the national airwaves in 1994.
Last Friday the Fed finally released a document describing the methodology behind it’s the long awaited stress tests (called Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)). As you know we have been calling for this triage to be imposed even before the September meltdown of Lehman and AIG (see our previous posts) According to the Fed document the process began in February and focused on banks with assets over $100 billion dollars. According to the Fed there are 19 firms in this group that collectively holds two-thirds of the assets and more than one-half of the loans in the U.S. banking system. Taken together this group supports a very significant portion of the credit intermediation done by the US banking sector.
Full results of how each bank fared are expected to be released by the Fed on Monday, May 4. The SCAP report can be found at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090424a.htm
However the initial pages of the report make ominous reading for anyone who is hoping for transparency, and more importantly, solutions, to come out of this process. The first sentence of the report states “Most U.S. banking organizations currently have capital levels well in excess of the amounts required to be well capitalized.” In reading further it did not get any better or more objective, thus significantly heightening our concerns that this exercise is designed to be a whitewash rather than a fact-finding process aimed at measuring the scale and depth of the problem such that appropriate remedies might be devised and implemented.
The SCAP document goes on to state: “The SCAP is a forward-looking exercise designed to estimate losses, revenues, and reserve needs for Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) in 2009 and 2010 under two macroeconomic scenarios, including one that is more adverse than expected. Should the assessment indicate the need for a BHC to raise capital or improve the quality of its capital to better withstand losses that could occur under more stressful-than-expected conditions, supervisors will expect that firm to augment its capital to create a buffer.”
Tested firms were asked to estimate potential losses on loans, securities trading positions, off-balance sheet commitments and contingent liabilities over a two-year time horizon. Firms trading over $100 billion in assets were also asked to estimate additional possible trading-related market losses and counterparty credit losses under the adverse scenario based on the market shocks experienced in late 2008. These submissions were then analyzed by supervisors from the Federal Reserve Board, the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
Anyone remotely familiar with the various contortions banks in the US have been going through in order to continue to project a “patina of solvency” to the market, knows that the banking system in the US is insolvent at a macro level. This is why Fed Borrowings have remained at historically unprecedented levels since the latter part of calendar 2007. The relaxation in the FASB 157 rule; a lax attitude by FDIC inspectors and it seems a continued unwillingness on the part of the Fed and the Treasury to admit to the true scale of the problems, add up to the reality that a Giant Bamboozle is Underway.
Furthermore, with the Federal Government borrowing all the dough on God’s green earth, thus effectively “crowding out” all but the most creditworthy borrowers, it is not clear how Zombie Banks might be expected to raise capital on economic terms and in sufficient quantities from skittish investors.
The answer to this is found in the nature of the stress tests themselves. The following table compares the “Stress Test” data to the worst recorded previous down cycles:
| |
| |
SCAP Scenarios
(2009-2010)
|
Previous Cyclical Evidence
|
| Indicator |
Baseline
|
Alternative “More Adverse”
|
Actual Data
|
| GDP Growth (cum) |
flat
|
-3.0%
|
-25.0%
|
| Unemployment (peak) |
8.9%
|
10.3%
|
25.0%+
|
| Housing (cum) |
-18.0%
|
-29.0%
|
-50.0%
|
| Bond Default Rates (peak) |
NA
|
NA
|
30.0%+
|
| |
|
|
|
|
On the surface, although the process looks legitimate and thorough, the reality is that the “Stress Tests” are anything but. In comparing the stress data to previous down-cycles one finds that the scenarios tested were not stress scenarios at all. In fact, the recently released GDP numbers show that the US economy is already contracting faster on an annualized basis than in the “More Adverse” scenario. Similarly the Bureau of Labor Statistics has already published unemployment numbers that exceed 13%. The SCAP does not even explicitly incorporate issuer default forecasts in its analysis. This seems strange in the context of a comprehensive risk assessment of lending institutions. We could go on with further criticisms of the process but it would belabor the point.
What this means is that the magnitude of the continued vulnerability of the banking system to economic weakness will not be revealed; the deposit-making and investing public will not know which banks are in real trouble and no transparent and credible plan to find and apply a solution will ever be found as a consequence of this exercise.
The whole point of the SCAP it seems has been to obscure the problem and prevent anyone from finding out how bad things really are. Most likely this is because there is significant confusion and debate within the Fed and Treasury and the Administration on the best way forward. These institutions appear to be making things up as they go along.
Despite our assessment, it is not clear that come Monday the SCAP report will announce a clean bill of health for all 19 Banks. That may have been determined to be too much for the market to swallow. More likely is that some of them will be shown to be at risk, but that on balance the system will be given a “Pass”.
This amounts to a very risky bet that the economy will improve sufficiently and within a short enough timespan in order to re-float the many sunken US banks that so far no one is admitting to the existence of.
What this means for investors is that traditional areas of activity – stocks , bonds and real estate – will remain danger zones despite the recent stabilization and/or uptick in prices. The apparent manipulation of this process also suggests that the current positive price action very likely constitutes a Bear Market Rally that should be avoided unless one intends to trade from the long side with tight protective sell orders and the intention of bailing before the music stops yet again.
In coming months we would not be surprised to see forward thinking investors contemplate entry into markets that are un-correlated with stocks, bonds, and real estate, and to diversify out of US Dollars – buying up commodities, precious metals and other instruments. Despite what US Representative Barney Frank has recently said about America’s largest foreign investor (”They are bluffing!!”), China is already leading the charge away from the Greenback.
”The Fed was forced to improvise in the Bear Stearns, Lehman and AIG episodes. These improvised actions have had mixed success” St. Louis Fed President James Bullard
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April 1st, 2009 Alex Jurshevski

1st April 2011
His Excellency
Mr. Xie Xuren
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
Dear Mr. Xie;
Using this opportunity I would like to express my gratitude to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for its continued support of the United States’ economic reforms, including the ongoing IMF-sponsored Staff Monitored Program (SMP). We are currently taking the necessary measures to address the problems associated with the episode of misreporting and risk management failure that was exposed in 2007, and to remove the institutional weaknesses that led to it. The field work for the special audit of the Federal Reserve Board has been completed and the draft report was made available to Dr Gideon Gono, the Special Advisor to the Federal Reserve Board System, in late December. We also made three repayments to the IMF, and expect to make the remaining sixty-nine payments as scheduled.
It is heartening that macroeconomic developments through end-September of last year were positive, despite recent difficulties which include the domestic civil disobedience and disorder that occurred in the aftermath of the recent re-basing of the US Dollar to the US Peseta standard; the unfortunate nuclear incident in the Middle East and the subsequent repatriation of US military personnel and forfeiture of materiel from every offshore base and operational area outside of the Continental USA (see below for revisions to National boundaries), and the significant escalation in the prices of imported electricity and fossil fuels imposed by Hydro Quebec, Ontario Power Generation and certain other energy companies in Canada.
Economic growth was stronger than envisaged under the SMP. This was partly driven by a surge in overseas remittances from US migrant workers, which allowed the Treasury to accumulate net international reserves faster than programmed. We were able to achieve an overall fiscal deficit (excluding the externally financed Public Private Investment Program, PPIP), of 7.0 % of GDP, slightly lower than targeted, largely because of buoyant revenues. At the same time, concessional loan disbursements under the PPIP at end-year were faster than anticipated, though all disbursements were made under existing loan agreements and do not constitute additional borrowing under the definitions agreed with Fund Staff. As a result of these disbursements, we now project a higher amount of concessional external borrowing at end-December than programmed. In this context, the Congress, on October 28, 2010, approved a three year debt management strategy that sets a debt ceiling of 180 percent of GDP. We also tendered the audit of the state-owned car company GM/Chrysler and the state-owned electricity company AIG/Con Edison, and issued legislation establishing a supervision unit in the Department of the Treasury for regular monitoring of the financial operations of the 500 largest state-owned enterprises.
We are confident that we will achieve our SMP policy objectives for end-December 2012. In this context, we remain committed to the policies and targets I set out in my letter to you dated June 15, 2010.
It is of note that the external environment will continue to weigh on the United States’ macroeconomic outlook in 2011. The ongoing global slowdown, in particular in China, Europe and Japan will continue to dampen demand for US export goods and weigh on consumer sentiment. However, given significantly reduced direct linkages to global financial markets, we do not foresee any meaningful direct impact on The United States’ financial sector. All in all, we still aim to sustain the same growth level as in 2010, around 0.0% (measured gross of land and natural endowment sales and certain adjustments to our national borders – see below).
Social Benefit and National Security spending will be helped by the secession of Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Montana, North Dakota, and Upper New York State to join the Dominion of Canada and the re-districting of the southernmost 200 miles of each of California (to include all of Baja), Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, into a buffer zone aimed at the containment of the drug cartels. At the same time, with global food, fuel and commodity prices soaring, we see inflation performance deteriorating throughout the year and the US Peseta depreciating in line with inflation differentials. As you know domestic CPI inflation in the United States remains stuck in the region of 12-15% while the inflation performance of our trading partners, most notably Canada and Europe remains anchored below 3%.
During the remainder of 2011, we expect to strengthen our net international reserves position somewhat faster than previously projected, and intend to save any revenue over-performance while maintaining strict expenditure control. This will be helped greatly by the anticipated revenues attached to the sale of the State of Hawaii to a consortium led by Club-Link Japan, Nike, and Tiger Woods Inc. Against that, it will take more time than initially thought to finalize the amendments to the new Federal Reserve Board Law and the new Commercial Banking Law. We have prepared a first draft of these amendments which go beyond the scope of the program, incorporating additional recommendations from the Financial Sector Stability Assessment (FSSA) report, and which we will now discuss with Fund Staff. We plan to submit these amendments to Congress by March 2012.
In this difficult global context, macroeconomic policies will be geared toward maintaining stability, while structural reforms will aim at raising the United States’ medium-term growth potential. The 2011 budget targets a modest overall fiscal deficit (excluding the PPIP) of 8.0 percent of GDP, allowing us to raise social spending by over 25 percent and undertake important investments in entitlements, roads, hospitals and other infrastructure. We do not see any scope for any reduction in the growth of net-debt in 2011 due to these important initiatives.
Negotiations with foreign creditors over Instruments and Guarantees issued by the Federal Reserve Board and Treasury are currently ongoing, and we are committed to settling all valid claims promptly while maximizing recoveries from domestic borrowers including the Federal Government. Our structural reform agenda for the remainder of 2011 will focus, inter alia, on: improving the deteriorated financial position and governance of the Federal Reserve Board, enhancing transparency and management at key state-owned enterprises, strengthening tax administration and public financial management, and creating an environment for financial sector re-development.
In line with our commitment to transparency of economic policies, we will continue publishing all SMP-related documents on the IMF’s website as well as the recent FSSA report. In addition, we will publish all key findings of the special audit of the Federal Reserve Board on the Federal Reserve Board’s website. Given the good progress we have made so far under the SMP and our firm commitment to successfully completing our 2011 program, we hope to begin discussions on a new program that could be supported by the Fund under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility in early 2012.
Your Excellency, please accept my assurances of my greatest attention to these matters of utmost importance,

Barack Hussein Obama
President of the United States
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